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ABSTRACT 	 -
The paper considers a recent econometric approach for analysing la-
bor supply in a life cycle context. The model we present extends MaCurdy's
(1982) model in that the wage rate is assumed to depend on previous labor
market experience. Our data gives, however, no support to this hypothesis.
The empirical results reported should be interpreted with caution because
observations on hours worked may be seriously biased and the wage rates are
only observed in one period.
Not to be quoted without permission from author(s). Comments welcome.
1. INTRODUCTION*
This paper focuses on life cycle analysis of labor supply. The
labor supply function is defined as the amount of time per year the indivi-
dual wants to spend in the labor market at a given .wage rate. For the ob-
serving econometrician the problem consists in estimating the parameters of
the corresponding probability distribution of the supply function.
Most work on labor supply is confined to a static setting. However,
it is reasonable to assume that individuals make their current labor market
decisions subject to past experience, plans and expectations about future
income, family, education . and employment career. Therefore, the coeffici-
ents of the labor supply function estimated within the one period framework
confuses the response of those wage changes arising from movements along a
given lifetime wage profile with parametric shifts in the wage profile
resulting fram differences between individuals. Consequently, the para-
meters of the static model have no clear behavioral interpretation in the
context of a life cycle framework. The life cycle approach implies that we
are able to distinguish between factors that determine an individual's
dynamic behavior and factors that determine differences in behavior between
individuals.
The theoretical approach relies on recent work on labor supply by
Heckman and MaCurdy (1980), and MaCurdy (1982).
The econometric model developed here endogeneizes the individual
market wage by assuming that it might depend on past labor market experien-
ce. The model is also shown to be consistent with optimal behavior under
uncertainty with respect to job opportunities and future wages. Two mea-
sures of labor supply, namely annual participation probabilities and
desired hours of work, are derived fram assumptions about individual pre-
ferences and lifetime income constraints in an environment of uncertainty.
Accordingly, our model extends the Heckman/MaCurdy S approach since they
11.
assume that wages are exogenous. When the market wage depends on experien-
ce, a rational individual does not directly compare the current wage rate
with the shadow price of leisure. Instead he compares the current wage
plus the expected increase in income anticipated from previous investment
in working experience (virtual wage) with the current shadow price of
leisure.
*Thanks to Steinar Strom, Per Sevaldson, Petter Frenger and Olav Ljones who
have given valuable comments during the preparation of the manuscript.
The empirical results. presented are based upon interviews of a
sample of married Norwegian women in 1980 about their employment, schooling
and family history from 1970-1980. Unfortunately, the quality of the data
is poor and the estimated parameters must therefore be interpreted with
caution.
The paper is organized . as follows. The following section is an
overview of essential theoretical assumptions and limitations. In section 3
the formal theory of life cycle labor supply with endogenous wages is
presented. Here the consumer is supposed to be perfectly certain about
future preferences, wages and job possibilities and to have freedom to
choose the desired hours Of work. Section 4 introduces uncertainty into the
model, and in section 5 the econometric specification is discussed. In
section 6 a stepwise estimation procedure is proposed. Section 7 contains
the empirical results.
2. OVERVIEW OF THEORETICAL ASSUMPTIONS 
As mentioned above, individuals' supply decisions in one period
depend on past experience and expectations about future job opportunities,
income, education, and family composition. Individual's labor market be-
havior is characterized by the fact that the labor market is only one among
several fields in which they may offer work. For example, the women's role
in society and in the family does still imply a number of commitments
outside the labor market which vary through the life cycle. Factors Influ-
encing female supply propensities ind behavior change in both strength and
type over life.
In the present analysis, a woman's preferences are assumed to Coin-
cide with those of the household. We assume that she adjusts consumption
and leisure in each period according to a smooth, strictly concave, in-
creasing utility index. However, a serious limitation is that credit con-
straints and the effect of taxes are neglected.
Previous work on life cycle labor supply have treated the wage rate
as exogenous. For instance, Heckman and MaCurdy (1980) specify a wage
function independent of past labor market experience while acknowledging
that this is unsatisfactory. Here, we adopt a wage specification where the
current wage depends on previous labor market experience.
Our analysis also attempts to introduce uncertainty (cf. MaCurdy,
1982). This is motivated by the fact that future wages, interest rates and
job opportunities are uncertain. In the presence of uncertainty we assume
that the individual maximizes expected lifetime utility; conditional upon
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past (and current) assets, interest rates and employment history.
Following MaCurdy (1982), the consumption and hours of work func-
tions depend on current wage, a life cycle component, kt, and a vector of
taste shifters. Mai variable Xt is the marginal utility of wealth in (cur-'
rent) period t. This variable summarizes past and future information rele-
vant to the woman's current choices. In an environment of perfect certain-
ty, Xt is a deterministic function of t. However, in the presence of usicer-
tainty, k becomes a random process, since the woman may revise her plans
and set a new value on current wealth as new unanticipated information
arrives. Although our model extends MaCurdy's work in that wages are
allowed to depend on previous labor market experience, the decomposition
into a life cycle component and current variables prevails. However, the
current wage variable must be replaced by a "virtual" wage variable. The
virtual wage is defined here as the current wage, plus the income increase
anticipated as a result of past and current investment in work. The estiiia-
tion of the consumption and hours of work equation is complicated by the
fact that neither the marginal utility of wealth, At , nor the virtual wage
are observed. However, due to the chosen fçorm of the wage function the
virtual wage can be expressed by X ' current and past income, interestt
rates and an individual-specific constant.
The optimal savings allocation rule implies that the expected value
of Xt+1 .as of period t depends only onThis property enables us tot .
obtain an estimate of the mean of the process {Xt}. AB indicated above,
is a function of past income and future expected wages. This means that in
order to predict the effect of shifts in anticipated future wages, it is
necessary to specify t as a function of these variables and to estimate
the parameters of this function. The parameters of the k function are
also needed to explain variation in labor supply across individuals. (If
data on consumption were observed, the analysis could be considerably sim-
plified, see MaCurdy, 1983.) For the sake of expository simplicity,
suppose the supply equation has the forn
logh(t) = alogW(t) 4 Plogkt ytx(t) 	 t(t).
where h(t) is hours of work supplied in period t, ii(t) is the virtual wage,
x(t) is a vector of taste shifters and C(t) is a random term. The coeffi-
cient a is interpreted as the intertemporal substitution elasticity of
labor supply. Recall that the intertemporal substitution elasticity mea-
sures the Impact of wage increases fram one period to another on the labor
supply in the current period relative to the supply in the other period. It
is implicitly understood that k t is given, which means that the elastidity
only measures the substitution effect, if no unanticipated event occurs.
Thus, the u-parameter accounte for the impact on labor supply of evolutio-
nary wage changes, i.e. of wage changes that follows an expected profile
over the cycle. It is important to emphasize that the a-coefficient does
not account for the effect of parametric changes in the wage profile, i.e.
for wage changes that alters the level/or the trend of the wage profile.
The reason for this is that when a . parametric wage change occurs, the indi-
vidual revises his plans and sets a new value for X. Thus, as mentioned
above, we must know Xt as a function of past income and future expected
wages in order to obtain the total effect of wage changes. This is a de-
manding task which is not dealt with in the present report.
3. A DYNAMIC MODEL OF LABOR SUPPLY WITH EXPERIENCE DEPENDENT MARKET WAGE
Assume that the individual's utility function at time t (age) is a
strongly additively separable, strictly concave - function of the form
Ut (L(t), C(t)) =	 t (C(t)) + g (L(t))
where C(t) denotes consumption of consumer goods and L(t) denotes leisure
consumed at age
Assume first that the consumer has full knowledge about future in-
terest rates and wages, and that the market is cleared at all periods.
Moreover, assume that the 'consumer can freely borrow and lend at an inter-
est rate r(t). The horizon is finite with length T and the total number of
hours available each year is M. If e is the rate of time preference the
lifetime utility function is assumed additive.separable'in time and given
by
(3.1)	 E (1 + e) -kUk (L(k ,C(10.).
k=0
As mentioned above, there is considerable empirical evidence that current
market wages depend upon past labor market experience (see Mincer, 1972).
In the present study we have therefore adopted a market wage specification
that incorporates past employment experience. Let W(t) denote the woman's
market wage in period t. Assume that
W(t) z w(t,t(t—l ))
where h(t) = M-L(t) is hours of work in year t and t(t) m (h(t),h(t-1),..).
For analytical convenience we assume that w is differentiable with respect
to the components of t(t). The wealth constraint equation is given by
(3.2)	 B(0) + E R(k)h(k)w(k,12(k-1)) - E R(k)C(k) m
km0 	 km0
where B(0) is the initiai- wealth, and
k
R(k) jao
is the discount factor that converts real income in period t into its
equivalent in period. zero. Here, goods prices are normalized to one.
Now consider the consumers optimal choice problem, i.e. the maximi-
zation of the lifetime utility function subject to the budget constraint.
The Langrangian of this problem is given by
(3.3)
	Q = E ((iv ) -k
kos0
(C(k)) + gk (L(k))]	 p(k)h(k))
+ p(B(0) + E [R(k)h(k)W(k) - R(k)C(k)])
km0
where p and p(k) k 0 are Langrange multipliers that correspond to the bud-
get constraint and the constraints h(k) k O. Since h(k) enters in the indi-
vidual's wage function the budget constraint becomes nonlinear and . we must
examine the problem whether there exists a unique solution.
Assuming the w(k,h(k-1)) is a concave function in h(k-1) it follows
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that
• h(k)w(k,)2(k-1))R(k)
k
is a concave function in h(k), k = 0,1,...,T. This is so because a sum of
concave functions is concave. Hence
E R(k)h(k)w(k,h(k-1)) - E R(k)C(k)
	
km0 	 •
	 m0
is a concave function in h(k) and C(k), k=0, 1,.
	
T. Moreover, - fk (C(k))
and gk (M-h(k)) are strictly concave functions so that the Langrangian (C)
is strictly concave. Thus a unique maximum of (3.3) is guaranteed.
The first order conditions yield
(3.4) 	 ft (E(t)) = Xt
(3.5) 	 g 't (i.: (t)) = ritkt
where 3.5) only holds
. when
g CM) < ,w
	t 	 - t t
and L(t) = M otherwise. Here
(3.6a)
•oc)
	
awt(k)R
	 (k)
	 .W(t) 4- E 1717 t
R(k)(3.6b ) W 	 = W(t) + • E
k>t
(k ITTET— l h t 0
aWt (h)
and L(t) and (t)are the optimal values of leisure and consumption, res-
7pectively. The function Wt can be interpreted as the current wage plus the
discounted future income increase. Hereafter Wt will be called the virtual
wage function where it is understood that the optimal values of hours of
work are inserted. Thus, we realize that if t were observable, then the
analysis would be completely analogous to the case with .experience indepen-
dent wages, The Lagrange multiplier is the marginal utility of wealth in
period zero and it is determined by (3.2), (3.4) and (3.5). It is a func-
tion in wages, interest rates and individual characteristics at all ages
but cannot be expreised in closed form.
If we compare an agent A with experience dependent wages, to agent
B with experience independent wages, we see that at the same level of
current wage rate A may work while B may not work. This is so because
agent A is ,investing, in future returns by working today while agent B
perceives no such effect from current behavior.
Heckman and MaCurdy (1980). interpret p as a permanent income compo-
nent in analogy with Friedman's and Mincer's permanent income hypothesis.
According to Friedman (1957), labor supply is a function of "permanent"
wage rates and "permanent' income. Mincer (1962) relaxes this assumption
and postulates that labor supply responds also to "transitory," wages and
income. Since 11 summarizes the effects of wages and income outside the
current period and since it.adjusts the effect of currint virtual wage on
labor supply according to income in other periods, it naturally adopts a
permanent income measure interpretation. Because this term is constant
throughout the life cycle it can be estimated for each individual provided
panel data are available.
. Below we state without proof the qualitative properties of the
model. We have.
ai(t)Nn771. 1 0 for fixed g,
a(t) 	 a8(t)
pI.I 0, 7.17- < 0,	 w(t
These'properties follow easily fram the properties of the utility
function.
The inequalities above mean that in an environment of perfect cer-
tainty a wage growth over the life cycle for an individual implies that
hours of work increase, or in case the person does not work, the probabili-
ty of working increases. This is so because the factor g remains constant
throughout thi life cycle. This type of changes is denoted evolutionary
wage changes because they refer to movements along a given wage profile. If
we consider different individuals with different wage profiles,  the picture
is more complicated because a shift in the wage profile induces a shift in
the factor g.
Since p decreases and t increases as a function of W(t) the total
impact on labor supply is ambiguous and cannot be settled a priori. Fur-
thermore, observe that the g function depends solely on wages in periods in
which the consumer works. This follows from the budget constraint equation,
since the terms for which hours of work equal zero vanish.
The measure of lifetime labor supply are defined by
t (k)
k250
and
E x (i(k))
k*0
where x(x) a 1 for x > 0 and zero otherwise. The first measure (N1 ) is the
total number of hours the woman wishes to work while the second (N2 ) is the
total number of periods she wishes to work. The following example discussed
in Heckman and MaCurdy (1980) illustrates the impact . of wage changes on
these two measures.
Let
] 	
- 	 - 1
[
w(t) for 0 <t<t, t <t<T2 — 	 —W(t) Is
.where w(t) is a function of time and c is a non-negative constant that is
independent of experience. This means that future wage increase is not
affected by c.
Now suppose that the consumer does not work in [t 1 ,t2 ]. Then an
increase in c will increase the probability of working in [tt2 ]. SinceI. 
this increase is not large enough to cause the woman to work, this increase
hks no effect on participation at other ages since g is independent of
virtual wages in periods in which the woman does not work. If the woman
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w(t) + c for t 	 t t- 	 - 2
works in [t 1 ,t 2 ] then we know that g is a decreasing function in the wage
in period t. Hence, an increase in c decreases the marginal value of
wealth. Since g decreases, the reservation wage at ages outside [t ,t1 2
increases so that the corresponding participation probability at those ages
decreases. Thus, for wage changes in [t 1 ,t2 ] there is no change in N1 and
N2 provided the woman does not work in [t1 ,t2 ]. Conversely, if the woman
works in [t 1 ,t2 ], an increase in c implies a decrease in g so that the
reservation wage at other ages increases. This means that the entry date
of participation increases and the exit date decreases and hours of work
outside [t
1
,t2 ] decreases. The effect on hours of work in it i ,t2 ] can,
however, not be settled .a priori. Therefore N2 decreases while N1 may
increase or decrease.
4. UNCERTAINTY
In the uncertainty case the consumer's prolem is to determine
. optimal behavior in the presence of uncertain future preferences, wage
rates, interest rates and job possibilities. There is also uncertainty
about future job opportunities, wages and interest rates. Wages and
interest rates may fluctuate in an unexpected manner and cause the consumer
to revise her plans. For non-employed persons there may be considerable
uncertainty about the chances on the labor market. • Persons employed in
certain industries may likewise face the risk of being laid off.
We conceive the process of obtaining employment as a two step
event. First the individual decides whether or not to search for jobs.
Second the firms select workers from those who search. As an individual
decision criterion we apply the expected utility paradigm. Individuals
maximize expected lifetime utility conditional on past wages, past and
current interest rates and preferences. Since uncertainty implies that the
individual may revise her plans, or may be unable to realize them, the
predicted hours of work,
 h(a), in period s as evaluated in period t (s>t)
may not coincide with realized hours of work in period s.
Specifically, consider an agent in period t that is not working.
By maximization of the conditional expected utility (subject to a sub-
jective probability structure) in period t she finds h (t). If h (t) = 0t t
she decides not to search in period t. Conversely, if ht (t) > 0 she will
search. The actual hours of work in period t may not be positive because
she may not succeed in obtaining a job.
We make the following assumptions about the search behavior: The
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cost of search is low due to small regional labor markets. Thislueans that
unless the subjective probability of getting a job is low, switch will take
place.
For the sake of analytical simplicity we suppose that the cost of
search is "almost" neglegible so that a non-working woman that wants work
searches unless the subjective probability of getting a job equals zero.
Thus the socalled "discouraged" workers are those who want work (at the
given market wage) but have subjective probability af getting a job equal
to zero. Furthermore, the woman is absumed to know the current wage rate
she would get if she gets a job. Since the cost of search is negligible
search behavior is therefore not affected by uncertainty about current
opportunities unless the subjective probability of getting a job vanishes.
Now let us proceed to the formal analysis. The woman is assumed to
maximize expected utility conditional on past consumption of leisure and
goods, and given current and past wages. In the uncertainty case we find it
convenient to express the budget constraint (3.2) in terms of the current
decision variables.
At age t the woman faces the budget constraints
(4.1)	 C(t)	 13(t) + h(t)W(t)
	 S(t), h(t) 1 0
where B(t) is the wealth at the beginning of period t and SW is
the wealth at the end of period t. We have
B(t+1) = (l+r(t 1))S[t
1.e.. wealth at the beginning of period t+1 is equal to the wealth at the
end of period t plus the interest in period t The .terminal condition is
B(T) k 0.
*In order to simplify the optimizing problem we shall assume that
the wage function has the form
where
=	 Ch(t-1), h(t-i),...
D (h) is a function that is known to the individual an u is a stochastict ft
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term that reflects the womans uncertainty about her future wages.
suppose that itt does not depend on D (h ).t
Let L(k), 1-1(k), E(k) and §(k) . denote the demand functions, respec-
tively, conditional on all information up to age k. The Lagrangian for the
corresponding utility maximization problem as of period t is given by
(4.2) 	 t (L(t), C(t)) + t (h(t)w(t) + Et) - s(t) - c(t)). at
v h(t)
+ t E . (1+1) t-kUk (L(k), h(k)W(k) + (1+r(k))S(k-1) - S(k))}k=t+1
where t and vi k 0 are Lagrange multipliers and Ét denotes the expectation
operator conditional on information prior to t+1.. From (4.2) we get the
following first order conditions:
as
'WU a °
(4.3)	 t(8 (t)) 	 n
aC2
inirtT at 0 st
(4.4)
	 g (LW) 	 X W(t) + {t 	 t k.taila ta k
aw(k) 1
170771
ar2
tTsrt7 is 0 >
(4.5) 	 kt if1+r(t+1 t" 141, t+3.t+i .
Combining 4.3) and (4.5) yields
11+r(t+1) (4.6) 	 Xt a't'' 1+e t+1 }
"By inserting 4.3 into (4.4) we get
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(4.7) 	 g ((t)) • 	 X W(t) + it( E (141)t-kkk 	 MITi(k) all(k)1 vtk=t+1
where NI > 0 when h(t) = 0 and vt = .0 otherwise.
Now eq. (4.6) implies that we may write
(4.8) t+1t+1
where Et t+1 = 1. Hence
(4.9)
	 (1+e)t-kkk
where
ck (t)
R(k)
R(t) Ic (t)
Ckck+1 ct+1 itCk (t) = 1.
As a consequence (4.7) may be written
(4.10) gt (  t)) 	 11 (
	t t ))	
vt
where
(4.11) iit ((t)) W(t) + 	 E 	 Elk)
	t 	
WIT Ck(t)i(k) aW(k)1
Here, W(k) is the wage at age k given that the choices of hours of work up
to time k-1 has been made optimally. The function W is the expected value
of future discounted marginal earnings plus present wage where the dis-
count factor is modified by Ck (t). This variable accounts for the effect of
unanticipated shocks in the marginal value of wealth.
From (4.10) we see that when
(4.12) gt(M) 	 X(M) E tWt
the woman decides to, work. In that case hours of work is determined by
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(4.13) gt ( .(t)) 	 = 	 XtWt a(t)).
Thus, we have obtained the familiar decision Criterion except for
the fact that the function Wt is not observable to the analyst.
5. TEE ECONOMETRIC SPECIFICATION
As indicated above the econometric implementation of the above
model is complicated by the fact that neither the function D nor kt are
observable. In the following we shall only consider the supply function
given that the woman works. In the present section we assume that logW(t)
is linear in experience where experience is measured by
H(t) 	 log(&ilaq
—
The wage • function is assumed to have the fors
(5.1) 	 logW(t) 	 • 	 X2 (t)b 44- nfl(t-1) + t(t)
where X2 (t) is a vector of exogenous variables that affect the wage and
t(t) is a zero mean disturbance term. Assumption (5.1) implies that
T{ 	 R(k),.(5.2) 	 Vit (L(t)) • w(t) 4. oa L. 1771.kk=t+1 t komon(t)),
The problem now is to predict
T
E: E ROOt t)i(k)w(k)/E ( t)).
If we are willing to assume that
(5.3) 	 Etit{ E R(k)C (t)h(1)4/(k)} Its E{ E R(k R kmk)}]c-1+t
	k=1+t
then one possibility is to specify E i(k)W(k)R(k-t)/L t as
k>t
(5.4)	 E Et(k)W(k)R(k-t)/L(t) = m + X(t)m + x(t)
k>t
where m is an individual specific parameter, x(t) is an error term (possi-
bly autocorrelated) and X(t) is a vector of all the exogenous variables (of -
age t) that enter the model. When the parameters m and m have been
 estima-
ted we may predict the mean of 'it by
(5.5) t	 EW(t) + n(mo + X(t)m).
Note that if the error process, t(t), in the wage equation (5.1) is
autocorrelated then the experience variable H(t-1) may be correlated with
t(t).	 This is so because if C(s), s < t changes then labor supply in
period s changes so that
 h(s) and thereby H(t-I) is affected. 	 But t(s)
also influences t(t) since they are correlated.
Let
S(t, L(t)) =
gt (L(t))
A
t
The function S(t,L(t)) is the shadow price of leisure in period-t.
Like in the static case it is the ratio between the marginal (expected)
value - of leisure and the marginal value of wealth. However, the marginal
value of wealth is now
 a function of past virtual wages and of the distri-
bution of future wages. The important fact is that once A is given we
only need to know the virtual wage of the current period.in order to deter-
mine current hours of work because the effect of wages and preferences in
other periods are summarized in
 A.
Note that the formulation (5.2) rules out the case where the
investment capital is lost as a result of turnover or interruption of the
employment career.
As functional form - for the marginal preference for leisure we
14
assume
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(5.6) 	 gt (L(t)) = A(t)EM ]ci ut'
where A(t) is a taste shifter that depends on variables affecting the taste
for leisure, u is an error term that is non-random to the woman but random
to the analyst. The error process is non-negative and logut has zero mean.
Let X1 (t) denote the vector of variab1es that affect the preferences and
assume that logA(t) is linear in an unknown parameter vector c,
(5.7 ) 	 logA(t) = Xl (t)c .
Also let
'(5.8) 	 is	 xt (14-0 — /R(t).
By (4.6) the process {lit} is a martingale which means that E lp. ILL 1
Hence, it may not be unreasonable to assume that Eloglit logg i so 'that
the shadow price function can be represented as
(5.9) 	 logS(t,L(t)) a a + (a-1)1oeL(t)-E---) + X1 (t)c + t log(1+)
+ logR(t) + C 1 (t)
where 
c i (t) = logut loolt + logRi
and
a 	 logRi.
If we assume that the interest rate r(t) is approximately constant we may
write
t log(1+0 + logR(t) * t log(41 a tic
so that by (5.3), (5.4) and 5.9)
(5.10) (1-a)Y(t) = a + 	 t)c - kt-+ c (t)
when the woman works where
- c2 (t) = t- Elogi;t
and
Y(t) I al •
Using the approximation
* logEik
(5.10) can be written as
(5.11) 1-a)logY(t) = a + logEW t - Xl (t)c - kt + e(t)
where
e(t) = c2 (t) 	 c (t1
It is likely that {e(t)} is autocorrelated and we have assumed that this
error Process follows a first order autoregressive process, i.e.
(5.12) e(t) = Ce(t-1) + 6(t).
Here {8(t)} is a white noise process.
6. A STEPWISE ESTIMATION PROCEDURE 
The parameter, a, in equation (5.11). is individual specific accor-
ding to theory. With panel data it is possible to estimate these individual
specific parameters.
,Step 1: In step one the wage and the earnings equations are esti-
mated. As noted above we ignore the selectivity bias problem which stems
from the fact that the subsample of those who work is not a random sample
(see Heckman and MaCurdy, 1980).
For woman i the wage and the earnings equation are given by
(6.1) 	 logW (t) = b 	 + X2i (t)b + 1H t 1 + oc• 	 i
16
and
(6.2) E 12.(k)W (k)/Li	 i t)	= moi + Xi (t)m + x (t)k>t
where {c(t)} and {x(t)} are error processes that may be autocorrelated.
As mentioned above autocorrelation in (c(t)) implies that c (t) and
H(ti) are correlated. Here we assume that {c (t)} is a white noise pro-f
cess which allows us to ignore-this problem. When the parameters of (6.1)
and (6.2) have been estimated then the virtual wage may be predicted by
A
(6.3)	 logEW (t)	 b
oi + X2i (t)b + nH (t-1) + TICEoi + X t
where
	 ' indicates estimates.
Step 	 2: 	In • step two we estimate the structural labor supply
equation (5.11). Combining (5.11) and (5.12) and subtracting means give
(6.4)
	
V(t) = CVi (t-1)+ 1—a—e-a 2i 1 —a 2i tusi + 51 tl
where
Vi (t) = Y(t) - .. Z 1 (t)(t) = ft- 	 x(t) - i ),( 1—a)8!(t) 	 t)
= EY(t)/T,i = Et/T, i 	 Ei (t)/T, g, 	 E5(t)/T
t
and the parameter vector f is given by
kc
1•C' f
	
1—a
	 for j>1.
Eq. (6.4) can be estimated by using regression programs with the intercept
constrained to zero and the parameter vector associated with (-Z (t-1),
-Z2i (t-1)) constrained to be the product of the parameter vector associated
with (Z (t), Z2i (t)) and the parameter associated with Vi (t-1).
Thus, all the parameters C, 1—a, k and c can be estthated from
(6.4). The individual intercept, a i' which has the interpretation is the
negative logarithm of the marginal wealth in period one, can now be esti-
mated from (5.11).
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7. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
The data consists of 380 married women, age 25-38 in 1970. These
women where interviewed in 1980 about their labor market, educational and
family career from 1970 until 1980. (See NOS, 1980.) The annual hours of
work variable is constructed as follows: The average hours worked per week
is multiplied by numbers of weeks (minus vacations) per year. This means
that this variable may be seriously downward biased because weeks worked
may differ from number of weeks per year. The woman is "employed" in a year
if she works at least three months that year. As independent variables that
influence the preferences we use "number of children" and "age of youngest
child". As independent variables that affect the market wage we use "years
of education (after elementary school)", and labor market experience, as
defined in (5.1). We also use a regional labor market tightness indicator
that measures the deviance in the vacancies-to unemployed ratio from the
corresponding national level.
A serious limitation with our data is that income and wage are only
obtained for one year (1980). This implies that the wage rate at other
periods has to be predicted by a wage equation estimated from data for
1980.
 As discussed below, this may lead to biased estimates of the
parameters of the wage equation which in turn will produce biased wage
predictions.
As outlined in Section 6, estimation is performed in two steps. In
step one the wage equation is estimated. These estimates are displayed in
table one. Table one shows that the tightness indicator and the experience
variable have no effect on the wage rate. Hence, we have W(t) * W . In
order to test for possible selectivity bias we have estimated a non-
structural logit function for the participation probability and used the
logarithm of the estimated participation probability as an additional
independent variable. See Dagsvik (1986) for a justification of this
method.
The table shows that the coefficient that controls for selectivity
bias is not significantly different from zero.
The parameter estimates of the wage equation is likely to be biased-. because the error term in the wage equation may be correlated with the
independent variables. One reason for that is that an individual specific
intercept, which wiould be possible to estimate if we had wage data for
several periods, would probably be correlated with the independent
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variables. Since we cannot estimate the individual specific intercepts,
the error term contains a component that stem from the individual
differences in the intercepts. Second, as explained in section 5, the-
experience variable, H(t-1), may be correlated with the error term c(t
Table 1. Parameter estimates of the wage equation
Estimates	 Standard error
Intercept  	 3.607	 2.32
-2Years of education 	
 .	 5.1 10
Labor market experience - 	 -3.1 . 10-6
	-5 	 -5Tightness indicator  	 -5.4 10	 22 . 10
-	 -	 -2Log
 participation probability  	 -5.3 10,2	8.8 10
Residual standard deviation  	 4.9 . 10-2
R - wage equation	 ...... . ... 	 0.27
-20.59 . 10
-617.5 . 10
Step two is slightly different from the procedure suggested in
section 6 in that we estimate a reduced form hours of work equation. Since
W(t) * W(t) we may for computational convenience substitute ElogW(t) with a
linear combination of "years of education" and the tightness indicator. The
results are given in table two.
Even though the coefficient of the tightness indicator is not
significantly different from zero in the wage equation it may have a direct
impact on the hours of work equation because of regional variations in
rationing and institutional constraints on working hours.
Recall that the dependent variable is
V (t) n Yi(t) i	 where
h(t)
Y (t) I' 	 log
and M is 150 times number of weeks in a year. Thus v(t) is -positively -i
related to hours of work, h (t). We see that all the coefficients have the
expected sign and are significantly different fram zero (at 5 % level).
Table 2. Parameter estimates of the reduced form hours of work equation
Variables 	 Estimates • 	Standard error
	-3 	 -3Age  	 4.2 . 10 	 0.9. 10
	
- 	 -Number of children  	 -1.1 . 10 2 	0.3 . 10 2
	
-3 	 -3
'Age of youngest child  	 2.6 . 10
	 0.6 . 10
Years-of education 	  . 	 3.2 . 10 3 0.7 . 10-3-
5 	 -5Tightness indicator  
	 7 • 10-	  . 10
Autocorrelation coeff. (C)  
	 0.60 	 0.01
Multiple correlation (R2 ) 	 . OOOOOOO . 	 0.41 .1
Multiple correlation (R2)  	 0.142
Also the autocorrelation of the error term is significantly diffe-
rent from zero. Measured by the squared multiple - ccirrelation coefficient
2 	 •(R1 ) these variables explain 41 per cent of the variance in the V (t) vari-
able. Recall that we have controlled for individual differences by allow-
2ing the intercept be individual specific. Therefore R measures how much2
of the temporal evolution that is explained by the variables above.
However, R2 measures the effect of the explanatory variables when1
measures the goodness of fit of the equation
V (t) i tr+e (ti
where the error term e 	 is defined by
- Le 4 ( t) /T
t
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the lagged dependent variable is included. The correlation coefficient R22
and (t) consists of the variables in table 2. It is easily veryfied that
- 2
The goodness of fit measured by R2 demonstrates that 14 per cent of• 2
the variation In hours of work (over the life cycle) is explained by the
independent variables.
If only the subsample of those who work were used the corresponding
estimate is 25 per cent. (These results are not riported here.)
By combining the estimates of table 1 and table 2 it is possible to
obtain an estimate of 1/(a-1) which is the • intertemporal substitution
elasticity of leisure. By dividing the years-of-schooling coefficients
of table 2 by the corresponding coefficient of table 1 we get
-
1/(a-1) = -6.3 • 10-2 with standard error about 0.02. This means that
intertemporal substitution elasticity of labor supply is 0.88 for a woman
who works 10 hours per week and 0.25 for a. woman who works 30 hours per
week.
It is likely that this estimate is downward biased because the
estimate of the coefficient of the schooling variable in the wage equation
may be upward biased. This is explained as follows: Write the wage
equation for woman i
(7.1) 	 logWi(t) z boi + bE (t) + u (t)
where E(t) is the level of education of year t, ui (t) is the error term
and boi is 'an individual specific intercept that accounts for permanent in-
dividual differences in productivity that is not captured by E i (t). For
expository simplicity we have suppressed the remaining explanatory vari-
ables. Evidently (7.1) may be rewritten
(7.2) 	 logWi(t) B;o + bEi (t) + u(t)
where ;o is the mean intercept and
21
(t) = u(t) + boi -
22
Now, it is likely that boi is positively correlated with E(t) be-
cause level of education depends on motivation and ability which also
affects the permanent level of productivity. As a consequence, the error
term u(t) will be positively correlated with E i (t) which implies that the
least squares estimate on the basis of (7.2) will produce an upward biased
estimate of b. If, however, we had wage observations for several periods
for each woman then it would be possible to estimate and control for the
individual intercepts in (7.1). •
We also note that since the coefficient of the experience variable
in the wage equation is not significantly different from zero there is no
(significant) variation over the life cycle in predicted wage after the
education career is completed. This fact suggests also that the estimate
of the intertemporal substitution elasticity may be poor simply because
there is not much variation in the wage data.
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